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Abstract
In the Internet of Things (IoT) arena, a constant evolution is observed towards
the deployment of integrated environments, wherein heterogeneous devices pool
their capacities to match wide-ranging user requirements. Solutions for e-
cient and synergistic cooperation among objects are, therefore, required. This
paper suggests a novel paradigm to support dynamic cooperation among pri-
vate/public local clouds of IoT devices. Dierently from device-oriented ap-
proaches typical of Mobile Cloud Computing, the proposed paradigm envisages
an IoT Cloud Provider (ICP) -oriented cooperation, which allows all devices
belonging to the same private/public owner to participate in the federation pro-
cess. Expected result from dynamic federations among ICPs is a remarkable
increase in the amount of service requests being satised. Dierent from the
Fog Computing vision, the network edge provides only management support
and supervision to the proposed Mobile-IoT-Federation-as-a-Service (MIFaaS),
thus reducing the deployment cost of peripheral micro data centers. The paper
proposes a coalition formation game to account for the interest of rational co-
operative ICPs in their own payo. A proof-of-concept performance evaluation
conrms that obtained coalition structures not only guarantee the satisfaction
of the players' requirements according to their utility function, but also these
introduce signicant benets for the cooperating ICPs in terms of number of
tasks being successfully assigned.
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1. Introduction
The landscape of the Internet of Things (IoT) is being enriched by ever
more heterogeneous devices and objects, which oer a wide range of capabilities
depending on their specic hardware equipment.
Resource-constrained sensors and actuators, as well as high-performing nodes,
such as smartphones and smart vehicles, oer indeed a wide range of services
(e.g., computation, storage/caching, sensing/actuation). Therefore, actual im-
plementation of highly-integrated Internet of Things services and added-value
applications [1] may benet from the design of methods for the eective coopera-
tion among devices and network/cloud platforms in view of sharing information,
services, and capabilities.
Over the past years, academic and industrial communities have proposed
several paradigms to better exploit the potential of IoT devices [2]. Among the
most promising ones is, undoubtedly, the deployment of Cloud platforms to sup-
port novel and advanced mobile applications, which are quickly and decisively
impacting also on the design of IoT solutions. In the context of Mobile Cloud
Computing (MCC) [3] [4] supporting task ooading and energy savings is the
usual key objective. Instead, in the IoT domain [5] [6] the main goal is the
provision of solutions that best exploit the huge amount of data and services
oered by heterogeneous IoT devices.
A typical issue in traditional Cloud-based solutions, of undoubted concern
for IoT pervasive environments, is the need to keep latency in data transmission
to/from remote data centers under control. To reduce the impact of this param-
eter on the quality of the oered services, a recent popular approach is to move
micro data centers towards the edge of the network. Mobile Edge Computing
(MEC) [7], Cloudlets [8], [9], [10] and the recently emerging Fog Computing
[11] paradigm in smart environments follow this trend. The cited solutions aim
at creating a distributed infrastructure to eectively process data generated by
billions of IoT devices.
A further source of performance enhancement is the opportunistic coopera-
tion among mobile devices. The creation of dynamic local clouds, as proposed,
e.g., in [12] and [13], can lead to a shorter service execution time and lower
energy consumption. This result is a consequence of the increased computa-
tion, storage, and communication capabilities oered by a cooperative group of
mobile devices. However, in IoT scenarios the opportunistic cooperation needs
to include sensing, actuation, and location-based services other than computa-
tion, storage and networking cloud services, typical of mobile cloud computing
settings. Besides, distributed approaches to task allocation usually introduce
too stringent requirements into IoT devices and raise scalability and reliability
issues in a highly dynamic environment.
On the basis of these considerations, this paper investigates on a novel hy-
brid paradigm, Mobile-IoT-Federation-as-a-Service (MIFaaS), which exploits
typical features of Fog computing to support dynamic cooperation among pri-
vate/public clouds of IoT objects. The proposed solution allows for a better scal-
ability and a signicant reduction in complexity and costs in the network access
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Figure 1: Mobile IoT cloud federation scenario.
segment compared to the deployment of micro data centers. In fact, accord-
ing to the MIFaaS paradigm, objects themselves are able to provide resources
\on-the-y". Nonetheless, dierent from the typical device-oriented approach
in MCC solutions, where the single device can receive support from nearby
opportunistic devices and their embedded resources only, in MIFaaS the atten-
tion is on the federation of pools of devices/objects managed by private/public
owners, the so-called IoT Cloud Providers (ICPs). The proposed paradigm has
the potential to introduce a broad set of advantages for end-users, network and
service providers, well beyond those thoroughly investigated and validated in
this paper; these advantages include: (i) enabling value-added services imple-
mented through the federation of distributed IoT services and things belonging
to dierent ICPs; (ii) costs savings derived from the reduced need to set up
resource-hungry connections to the remote cloud, for service and management
purposes; (iii) a better QoE, e.g., in terms of shorter latency in accessing a given
service, by leveraging locally available resources (not only the ones provided by
the owned devices); (iv) availability of a broader portfolio of services for end-
users compared to the case in which they operate in a stand-alone manner (i.e.,
by leveraging only on their own resources).
The network edge node plays an important role in the implementation of
the proposed paradigm for the reduction of the computational burden (and
the energy consumption) in the local ICPs. As shown in Fig. 1, it hosts the
functionalities to manage several tasks, such as: information collection about
identity and capabilities of the devices; resource abstraction and denition of a
common access interface to the services oered by local IoT devices (based on
virtualization techniques); collection of service requests and, above all, dynamic
management of cloud federations according to device capabilities and service
requirements. The edge node hosts the \orchestrator", which manages federa-
tions among public/private IoT clouds and enables the ecient sharing of their
resources to deliver highly-integrated IoT services, whereas task execution is
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completely delegated to IoT devices. The objective is to support ICPs in tak-
ing the best decisions regarding their federation by considering them as rational
self-interested entities that aim at maximizing their own benets (i.e., their own
utility). The role of \orchestrator" may be played by either the Telco operator
or by any other third-party entity who has a business interest in oering addi-
tional and enhanced services to its subscribers. This is the case, for example, of
a coee shop owner, a university, a theatre, or a smart city municipality.
The major contributions of this paper are:
 The proposal of a novel Mobile-IoT-Federation-as-a-Service (MIFaaS) so-
lution to support the federation of private/public mobile IoT clouds in
heterogeneous IoT environments;
 The denition of a coalition formation game model allowing the rational
and self-interested ICPs to take their grouping choices and converge to a
Nash-stable solution in which no ICP has incentive to leave the proposed
solution;
 A proof-of-concept performance evaluation campaign to demonstrate the
enhancements introduced by the proposed solution w.r.t. classic device-
oriented solutions in terms of number of task requests being successfully
allocated and in terms of ICP satisfaction.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the related
works. In Section 3 we describe the proposed system and reference scenario for
the edge-assisted ICPs federation. Section 4 and Section 5 describe the game
theoretic coalition formation model and the conducted performance evaluation
campaign, respectively, whereas a discussion on future works and open chal-
lenges is presented in Section 6. Final remarks are given in the concluding
Section.
2. Related Work
2.1. Mobile Cloud Computing and Fog Computing
The scientic literature on Mobile Cloud Computing [14] has extensively
investigated the interaction among mobile devices and a xed data center to
provide resources to deliver the desired service. In particular, authors of MCC
[15] [16] have investigated optimization solutions for the application design and
deployment, whereas dynamic scheduling policies for adapting task ooading
to computation workload, time constraints, and network connectivity are the
subjects of articles such as [17] [18]. Cooperative Mobile Cloud schemes can be
straightforward classied into two schemes. Infrastructure-less cooperative so-
lutions to create local mobile clouds have gathered a wide interest [12], [13], [19].
In particular, these solutions rely on a distributed cooperation to create collab-
orative computing platforms where the devices mutually share their resources.
The main drawback of such a distributed approach is the signaling overhead
needed to coordinate the cooperation activities and to build an updated and
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shared knowledge of the current network state, the available resources, and the
received service requests. On the other hand, infrastructure-based approaches
foresee a task ooading from mobile devices to remote high-capability data cen-
ters, as proposed, for instance, in [3] and [4]. Typical limitations of the approach
are in terms of latency and bandwidth requirements for communication with a
remote server. To overcome these drawbacks, the authors of [8] proposed the
concept of micro data centers, deployed in the network access points and known
as Cloudlet. The extension of the Cloudlet concept into the IoT scenario, re-
sulting in the denition of the so-called Fog Computing [20], brings along with
it the necessity of solving several specic IoT-related challenges, such as for ex-
ample the management of a huge number of heterogeneous IoT devices involved
in the process. To this aim, there is a growing impetus in the design of cloudlet-
based solutions able to eectively support sensing and actuation applications
[21] [22]. Telco providers are facing a trade-o between the correct dimension-
ing of resources to support IoT services and the nancial costs deriving from the
deployment of a large number of processing nodes located very close to the cus-
tomers. The MIFaaS paradigm proposed in this paper supports Telco providers
in achieving the above mentioned trade-o by leaving control and orchestration
functions to the edge nodes (thus reducing their processing capabilities), and
completely delegating task execution to IoT devices. The idea of a resource
coordinator elected among the mobile nodes is proposed in [23] to manage the
matching between application requests and device resources. The authors of
[24] consider IoT Cloud federations for physically dislocated platforms with the
focus on authentication and security issues, whereas in [25] the authors propose
the refactoring of the Cloudlet in a controller so that nearby devices can be con-
gured into a coordinated cloud computing service. However, both papers do
not actually tackle the heterogeneity of IoT objects in terms of capabilities and
resource constraints. As a further dierence with our research, a single mobile
local cloud is considered, thus suering from scalability and exibility issues.
2.2. Game theoretic models for federation formation
A preliminary analysis of edge-assisted collaboration of local clouds has been
proposed in [26]. In this paper, we take forward our research by proposing a
game theoretic model for the federation formation problem, which allows to bet-
ter capture the rationality of the users (the ICP owners) and their willingness
to join or leave a federation according to their personal preferences over the
utilities they reach. We have also extended the analysis in a wider set of scenar-
ios and proved not only that a high number of ICPs increases the percentage
of satised tasks, but also that our federation approach is able to guarantee
the ICP satisfaction. A current open challenge to promote the eective deploy-
ment of federations among private/public ICPs is to identify adequate sources
of motivation and incentives that facilitate the end-user decisions to share their
private resources within the federation. If the framework is able to guarantee
the desired ICPs' outcomes according to their specic preferences, then ICPs
will be more willing to adopt the proposed solution. Therefore, the game the-
oretic modelling and the relevant stability analysis plays a fundamental role to
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reach this goal. Indeed, several researchers [27] [28] have recently applied game
theoretic solutions to model the interaction among devices and to share the
increased revenues deriving from a cooperative resource sharing in the context
of mobile cloud computing. In particular, cooperation among mobile cloud ser-
vice providers is investigated in [27], where available resources are shared and
better utilized to increase revenues. Classic game theoretic solutions model the
way to share the increased revenues. Dierently, the authors of [28] propose a
congestion game to model a power management scheme for mobile cloud com-
puting to minimize power consumption of both the servers on the cloud and
the mobile devices. Our work dierentiates itself from the cited papers as it
addresses methods to enable eective federations of local clouds. In this area as
well, several research activities targeted to study cooperative approaches among
cloud providers have been conducted. Coalitional game theory concepts have
also been considered in [29] to formulate an economic model for the federation
of virtualized computing and network resources, where the Shapley value is pro-
posed as a means for participants to share the value of a federation. Close to
our problem, the authors of [30] and [31] study a coalition formation game for a
set of Cloud providers willing to federate to increase their revenues. In partic-
ular, [30] proposes a distributed algorithm to cooperatively set up federations
that allow to increase the individual benet in terms of energy cost reduction
with respect to the case in which users work in isolation. While [31], instead,
addresses a method to form federations of cloud providers so to maximize their
prot when a set of resources is requested. A key dierence with the model for
the ICPs federation in this paper is in the need to consider the extreme hetero-
geneity of IoT services and resources of the devices belonging to ICPs. To this
aim, the key features of the model, such as the utility function and the prefer-
ence relation for the players in the game, are tailored to the specic problem
and challenges of ICP federation. With regard to the transferable utility game
theoretic approach used in [30] and [31], a further dierence is that the utility
for the proposed game is non-transferable and is dened by a weighted function
of the number of tasks executed for a player and the resources used by the same
player in a cooperative federation of personal clouds.
2.3. Task allocation in the IoT
An additional issue our paper addresses is task allocation for the IoT. Al-
though task mapping has been extensively analyzed in the literature [32], IoT in-
troduces new constraints and challenges that require an appropriate re-formulation
of the problem. Indeed, IoT applications typically require the composition of
very dierent tasks. In a smart city environment, for example, a common ap-
plication request is to manage a trac jam. The needed tasks are related to
the sensing of the environment, such as counting the number of cars involved
and the trac ow in other areas of the city, the real-time processing of the
information obtained, and the activation of physical objects, e.g., trac lights,
to address the trac jam. IoT solutions need to manage the interdependen-
cies of these complex IoT services, and to provide ecient methods to allocate
the relevant elementary tasks to the available IoT devices, while verifying the
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satisfaction of the application constraints. To this aim, the literature [33] [34]
provides several interesting heuristics. In particular, the authors in [33] model
IoT services as task graphs in terms of data streams and operations to be dis-
tributed over the network; a task mapping algorithm is available, which aims
at minimizing the consumption of resources among the available nodes. In [34]
instead, group of nodes able to perform similar tasks cooperate to distribute the
relevant requests by leveraging a consensus-based approach. In the context of
IoT Cloud platform federation, the VITAL project proposes an architecture of
Cloud of Things [35] by dening interface virtualization as the enabling means
to access data and services from heterogeneous objects supported by dierent
IoT ecosystems. These activities do not focuse on task allocation and federation
algorithms; thus can be considered as complementary to our study in the view
of providing users with a global IoT ecosystem.
3. Reference Scenario and System Model
In the reference scenario, we dene an ICP as a local cloud of connected
devices belonging to the same owner. The ICP owner may be a private user, a
public authority (e.g., a Smart City municipality), a service provider, the owner
of a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), the owner of a power network, among
others. In general, devices belonging to a single ICP may dier a lot from
one another. For instance, a private ICP owner may register devices such as
a smartphone, a laptop or a smartwatch, whereas a public ICP owner (Smart
City municipality) may register roadside units, pollution sensors, smart trac
lights, security cameras, and others. As already discussed, the orchestrator in
the edge node is responsible for the creation and maintenance of opportunistic
federations to enable the provision of advanced IoT services. In our reference
scenario, we assume that the edge node is the rst network access point for the
ICP. In particular, we consider small area scenarios, such as a city neighborhood,
a shopping mall, a theatre, a stadium, a university campus. Section 6 presents
a discussion on possible research directions to extend the proposed solution to
wide-area scenarios, where multiple edge nodes are taken into account. Fig. 1
shows a reference scenario adhering to the MIFaaS philosophy and illustrating
the presence of dierent private/public ICPs.
When the ICP owner registers its devices to the reference edge node, then
a virtual counterpart for the ICP is created, the so-called \ICP controller".
This is a software component running in the edge node and responsible for the
resources and services management of the corresponding ICP. To this aim, the
ICP controller maintains an updated status of the services oered by the devices
forming the ICP and of their available resources (e.g., computation, processing,
and sensing).
The ICP controller is able to address the heterogeneity of the physical ob-
jects, since all the communications among objects are handled at a digital level,
where the ICP controllers of the same Telco provider interoperate through the
use of the same semantic description.
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Figure 2: Coordination ow.
Whenever a new request of resources comes from an application running on a
device of the ICP, the ICP controller is informed and handles it. A rst attempt
is made to handle the request by only exploiting the devices belonging to the
ICP. In case the devices under its control are not sucient to implement the
task, then a collaboration request is triggered to other ICP controllers running
in the same edge node. In this case, the orchestrator in the edge node acts as
a broker, which receives requests and status updates from the ICP controllers
and implements a federation algorithm to cooperatively oer added-value IoT
services by pooling together the capabilities and resources of the involved ICPs.
Fig. 2 highlights the procedure to implement the proposed solution. The
process starts with an application running on a user device that sends a service
request to the ICP controller at the edge node (1). If the set of devices belonging
to the ICP has not enough capabilities to handle the services, then a federation
request is sent to the edge node acting as broker or orchestrator of the incoming
requests. A software module at the edge node handles the request, which is
received together with information about the ICP status (2). After the collection
of a set of resource requests over a predetermined time interval, the edge node
triggers the federation formation process aimed at sharing the resources in terms
of computational, communication, storage, and information. The edge node
performs the resource management by assigning each task to the most tting
object in the federation. Once the edge node decides the federation, it noties
the \requesting ICP controllers" about the \supporting ICPs", and species the
number and type of tasks to be ooaded (3). Then the ICP controller transfers
to the specic devices the information about the tasks they have to perform (4).
Finally, the federated ICPs exchange input and output data through over-the-
edge communications (5).
It clearly emerges the importance of establishing a mechanism to wisely
allocate the tasks and handle the mobility of the ICPs. We address this issue in
the remainder of the paper. It is worth highlighting that the orchestrator in the
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edge node only supports the creation and management of the federation among
ICPs, by mediating the received requests and facilitating the synchronization of
the resource status for each ICPs' device. It does not provide the nal services to
users. Limiting the edge node role only to management responsibilities reduces
the costs of its deployment. This is a key distinctive feature of the MIFaaS
approach with respect to other solutions, such as Fog computing for example,
where the peripheral network nodes provide additional computing resources.
3.1. Service Model for the Edge-assisted ICP Federation
Without losing in generality, we consider a scenario with a single edge node
and several ICPs. The main objective of the edge node activity is to create
and orchestrate one or more federations of ICPs so that the number of executed
tasks is maximized, under the constraints set by the rational and self-interested
ICPs.
We consider a network with a set N of ICPs, where the i-th ICP is endowed
with a set of Di devices. Resources can belong to a set of M dierent resource
types. Each resource of the m-th type associated to the i-th ICP (i.e., oered
by one of its devices) belongs to a set Ri;m. In the remainder of the paper, the
generic r-th resource is identied by resi;m;r. The i-th ICP has a workload of
application requests mapped at the edge node onto task requests. The t-th task
request of the m-th type is identied by taski;m;t and belongs to the set of task
requests denoted by T i;m. Note that task request types and available resource
types coincide and are thus identied by the same set of types denoted by M.
A further important feature characterizing an ICP is its mobility. An ICP is
a local cloud of heterogeneous objects; we assume that all devices belonging to
the same ICP have the same mobility pattern. An example may be a pedestrian
user carrying multiple devices, or a car driver in a vehicle with multiple devices
around him. In particular, we make the following distinction: an ICP can be
either (i) static, like roadside units or a public trac light monitoring unit,
or (ii) mobile at a low speed, like a private person moving around the city
(pedestrian mobility prole), or (iii) mobile at a higher speed, like a vehicle
(vehicular mobility prole). The mobility parameter is of high concern during
task allocation, as it inuences the probability that a task is performed and the
result is timely received by the requesting ICP. As mentioned in the previous
section, we assume an \edge node assisted" solution, whereby once a task is
allocated to an ICP, the data exchange relevant to that task goes over the
edge node (solution also proposed in [25]). Therefore, it is important that
both requesting and executing ICPs remain under the coverage of the edge
node and maintain the connection to the corresponding ICP controllers, for the
time required to execute the task and transfer the results. We model this by
foreseeing that the edge node is able to predict the mobility pattern of the ICPs,
so that it can get a rough estimation of the probability that an ICP leaves the
area of interest and thus loses the contact with its ICP controller. To this aim,
in our model we include a mobility factor pi 2 [0; 1] for the i-th ICP, which
accounts for the contact time probability between an ICP and the serving edge
node: 0 stands for a static ICP, while 1 for an ICP moving away before the
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task conclusion with probability one. The research community is active on the
issue of user mobility pattern prediction in mobile and wireless environments,
with focus on the modelling of key parameters such as contact time duration
and the number of contact times [36] also based on the analysis of real traces
for human mobility [37]. We rely on these research contributions to support the
assumption that the edge node has the possibility to estimate the contact time
duration with the ICPs and by this include this knowledge in the federation
formation process. We are aware that in IoT scenarios other communication
related aspects may inuence the probability that devices belonging to dierent
ICPs can actually exchange data. Notwithstanding, the scope of our paper is
not to provide any novel contribution in the characterization of ICP mobility,
but to evaluate the impact the ICP mobility has on the overall federation process
and its performance.
In our problem formulation, the requesting ICP and the ICP which imple-
ments the task act in a federation. The event that the edge node loses the
contact with any of them should be avoided before the task output is success-
fully delivered to the requesting application. The case in which this event is
avoided is called successful task cooperation. Let pi represent the probability for
i-th ICP to leave the edge node coverage before the task cooperation ends, then
the successful task cooperation probability can be written as follows
Pj(taski;m;t) = P (A) \ P (B) = P (A)P (BjA) (1)
where taski;m;t is requested by the i-th ICP and executed by the j-th ICP,
event A is the probability of i-th ICP remaining under the edge node coverage
(1 pi), and event B is the probability j-th ICP remaining under the edge node
coverage (1  pj). We also introduce a compromise factor i 2 f0; 1g that gives
a measure of the willingness of the i-th ICP to make its own resources available
to the rest of the community so that other federated ICPs may use them for
their tasks. Finally, accounting for the dierent features of the IoT services,
we classify the tasks into exclusive-use tasks and shared-use tasks. The former
are those whose output can be used by a single ICP only; such as the case of
computational tasks where the relevant physical resources are typically allocated
to the specic needs of a single ICP. The latter are those whose result is usually
useful to multiple ICP requests, such as the case of sensing activities whose
output can be reused by multiple services. Indeed, sensing applications usually
require measurements of a physical phenomenon, relevant to a specic location
and with a desired level of Quality of Information (QoI). Even if multiple QoI
metrics could be dened in terms of precision, timeliness, completeness, and
relevance [38], in our paper we focus on data completeness which requires that
several measures are taken from dierent sensor devices to provide an accurate
and reliable sensing estimation. These measurements can be shared among
multiple applications if they are relevant to the same phenomenon, location and
time. A practical example is the case where two applications of dierent ICPs
require the current temperature information in the same location. Instead of
using two dierent sensing devices to collect the same information, it is more
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Table 1: Notations and symbols.
N Set of ICPs
Di Set of devices for the i-th ICP
M Set of resource types
Ri;m Set of resources of the m-th type at the i-th ICP
T i;m Set of task requests of the m-th type from the i-th ICP
taski;m;t t-th task request of the m-th type from the i-th ICP
resi;m;r r-th resource of m-th type available at the i-th ICP
i Compromise factor for the i-th ICPs
i;m;t Reuse factor for the t-th task request
pi Mobility factor for the i-th ICP
Pj(taski;m;t) Success probability for task taski;m;t
being executed by the j-th ICP
T Q(S) Set of requested tasks in federation S
ecient to share the information among the interested ICPs. This justies the
introduction of the so-called reuse factor associated to a task, namely i;m;t 2
f0; 1g, which represents the measure of the possibility for a task to be reused
by multiple applications (e.g., a reuse factor of 1 may be set for sensing data).
Please refer to Table 1 for the list of notations used in the paper.
4. A Coalition Formation Game for the ICP Federation
To model the cooperation problem among the ICPs we use the coalitional
game theory [39]. We dene a non-transferable utility (NTU in short) coalitional
game (N ;V), where N is a set of N players and V is a function, such that, for
every coalition S  N , V(S) is a closed convex subset of RjSj. The latter
contains the payo vectors that the players in S can achieve, and jSj is the
number of members in the coalition S. The game is in characteristic form
because the achievable utility in a coalition only depends on the players forming
the coalition and not on the other players in the network. We dene V : S ! RjSj
such that V(;) = ;, and for any coalition S  N 6= ; it is a singleton set
V(S) = fv(S) 2 RjSjg where each element of the vector v(S) is the value vi(S)
associated to each player i 2 S.
The objective for the players in this NTU game is to maximize their asso-
ciated value in the coalition they belong to. Such a value is considered as the
dierence between the gain that the players obtain (the utility) in cooperation
minus a cost term associated to the sharing of their resources. The utility term
for any ICP is associated to the number of tasks being executed over the num-
ber of tasks requested, whereas the cost term is a measure of the amount of
resources used to execute all assigned tasks over the total amount of available
resources at the ICP. Moreover, we introduce a weighting term in the deni-
tion of the player value, the so-called compromise factor, which measures the
importance attributed to the cost the player has to face to obtain the utility.
This parameter allows to better model the inuence of the ICPs rationality and
explicitly consider their willingness to make their own resources available to the
rest of the community, so that other federated ICPs may use them for their
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own tasks. This reects a subjective interpretation of utility and costs for each
player. In particular, its value may change over time according to the current
ICP conditions in terms of available resources and importance/priority of the
tasks. For instance, in case of high priority services, the ICP is more interested
in achieving her goal rather than saving her own resources leading to a low value
selection for the compromise factor. Dierently, when the ICP is willing to keep
the usage of the own resources low (e.g., due for example to the scarcity of
resources), then it will set the compromise factor to a high value so that it will
be involved only in highly advantageous federations. To simplify the analysis
of the results and without losing generality, during the performance evaluation
(see Section 5) we consider all players having a constant and equal compromise
factor.
It is evident that having a cost term in the characteristic function, leads
to a non-superadditive game with disjoint coalitions forming a partition  2
(N), where (N) is the set of all partitions. In general, the set of all possible
partitions of N has a total number of BN , where BN is the N-th Bell number
[40], and it grows exponentially with the number of players N . Thus, nding the
optimal partition via exhaustive search through all possible partitions, being an
NP-complete problem [41], is unfeasible. An alternative solution is to introduce
a preference relation over coalitions so that the game is written in the form of an
hedonic game [42] and players adopt switch operations based on their preferences
over the potential coalitions to be a member of, based on who else is in the
coalition. We thus dene a collection of coalitions C as the set C = fC1; : : : ; Clg
of mutually disjoint coalitions Ci  N such that Ci \ Ci0 = ; for i 6= i0. If the
collection contains all players in N , i.e.,
lS
i=1
Ci = N , then the collection is a
partition  or coalition structure [39].
In our problem, for a given federation S  N we determine the value for
a player i (i.e., ICP i) in the federation as a function of its utility term ui(S)
and its cost term ci(S). In particular the utility term ui(S) is a measure of the
number of tasks being successfully executed over the number of requested tasks,
which is dened as:
ui(S) =
P
m2M
P
t2T i;m
P
j2S
xi;m;t;j  Pj(taski;m;t)P
m2M
jT i;mj (2)
where xi;m;t;j is a binary variable assuming value 1 if task taski;m;t requested
by the i-th ICP is implemented by the j-th ICP (note that i may be equal to
j if task taski;m;t is implemented by the requesting ICP itself) and value 0
otherwise, whereas Pj(taski;m;t) is the successful task cooperation probability
dened in (1) and T i;m is the set of task requests for the i-th ICP of type m.
The cost term, instead, is a measure of the available resources of any single
ICP that are being used in the given coalition. To account for the heterogeneity
of the ICPs, we dene dierent weights as it follows. Given the i-th ICP, we
introduce a weighting factor wi as a function of the number of dierent resource
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types at the i-th ICP, that gives the corresponding weight to the resources being
used to solve a task. Thus, the cost term for the i-th ICP in a federation S  N
is dened as:
ci(S) =
X
m2M
wi
P
j2S
P
t2T j;m
yj;m;t;i  taskj;m;tP
r2Ri;m
resi;m;r
(3)
where yj;m;t;i is a binary variable assuming value 1 if task taskj;m;t requested
by the j-th ICP is implemented by the i-th ICP (j may be equal to i if the
performed task taskj;m;t is requested by the executing ICP itself) and value 0
otherwise. Noteworthy, in those cases where Ri;m = ;, the corresponding m is
not considered in the summation to prevent the cost from raising to an innite
value.
We are now ready to dene the value for the single i-th ICP in a federation
S  N as:
vi(S) =
8<: 1
S
m2M
T i;m = ;
ui(S)  i  ci(S) otherwise
(4)
where i is the so-called compromise factor. In eq. (4), the rst condition refers
to the case where a player has no task requests and we prevent this player from
joining any coalition. The rationale behind this choice is that a player is self-
interested and non-altruistic in the sense that it is not interested in oering his
resources (cost) without obtaining any utility for it (task requests). Noteworthy,
this condition may be removed in case other design solutions are preferred.
Finally, the value for a generic federation S  N of ICPs is dened as:
v(S) =
8<:0 T Q(S) = ;P
i2S
vi(S) otherwise (5)
where T Q(S) = S
i2S
S
m2M
T i;m is the set of task requests in the federation.
Note that, the rst option is representative of the situation where no tasks are
resolved in the considered coalition, in which case the value is readily equal to
zero.
To compute all the terms of this model, a task allocation algorithm is re-
quired to map the set of task requests in the federation with the available
resources. Task allocation is used by the edge node to dene the value for the
players and the coalition. If the coalition is part of the nal partition, then
the proposed task allocation will be actually implemented by the cooperating
ICPs. Being task allocation not the main focus of this paper, we consider a sim-
ple algorithmic solution, based on a greedy approach. More sophisticated and
eective algorithms can be easily taken from the literature and used without
aecting the validity and the generality of the proposed cooperative paradigm.
In particular, the chosen task allocation algorithm aims at mapping as many
task requests as possible to the resources of the involved ICPs, compatibly with
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the resources available at each device. When a new task from the list of total
requested tasks must be allocated, the edge node performs the following steps:
(i) if the reuse factor i;m;t for the task is equal to one, then the edge node looks
among the tasks already allocated to verify whether any of the corresponding
allocated resources can also serve the new considered request; otherwise it (ii)
starts searching for a suitable device with the needed resources by rst ranking
the available nodes in terms of mobility pattern and number of currently serving
tasks; (iii) then it selects the device with the lowest mobility factor and num-
ber of executed tasks, so that higher probability of task execution success and
load balancing are enabled; (iv) it allocates the task to the corresponding ICP
owning that device; and eventually, (v) the ICP controllers update the resource
availability status relevant to all the involved devices.
4.1. Coalition formation algorithm
The non-superadditivity of the cooperation model entails the formation of
disjoint coalitions leading to a coalition formation game. A key approach to
coalition formation is to enable players to join or leave a coalition based on well-
dened preferences. The preference order i for any player i 2 N , is dened as
a complete, reexive, and transitive binary relation over the set of all coalitions
that player i can possibly form, i.e., the set i of coalitions containing i. In
particular, for each player i, if C i C0, then this means that i prefers being a
member of coalition C more than coalition C0. A less restrictive preference order
is C i C0, whereby player i prefers coalition C at most as much as coalition C0.
The criterion or preference order to be used for comparing two partitions can
either be coalition payo orders or individual payo orders. In this paper the
preference order is dened so that, for each ICP i 2 N and for all fC; C0g 2 i,
we say that:
C i C0 , fi(C) > fi(C0) (6)
where the preference function fi() is dened for any ICP i and any coalition
C such that:
fi(C) =
(
vi(C) C =2 H(i) or (jCj = 1)
 1 otherwise (7)
In particular, vi(C) is the payo for ICP i in coalition C, which is dened
as in Eq. (4); H(i) stores the history of the coalitions already visited during
the algorithm execution to avoid an ICP to visit twice the same coalition that
was left based on the preference of one of the players in the coalition, with the
exception of the singleton coalitions (i.e., the coalitions with cardinality equal
to one) [43]. In other words, any ICP i prefers being a member of coalition C
over C0 if its individual payo is increased.
The so-dened preference order is at the basis of the switch operation for
the coalition formation. In particular, given a partition  = fC1; : : : ; Clg on
the set of players N and the preference relation dened in equation (6), an
ICP i 2 N decides to switch coalition (and consequently modies the coalition
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structure), leaving its current coalition C(i) to join another dierent coalition
Ck 2 nC(i)
S ; if and only if it prefers being part of the new coalition accord-
ing to the preference relation, i.e., Ck
Sfig i C(i). When a switch operation
is applied by a player i, the history of the visited coalitions H(i) is updated so
that also C(i) is included. Similarly, the current partition  is to be updated
as follows:
0 = (nfC(i); Ckg) [ fC(i)nfig; Ck [ figg):
The coalition formation game for the cooperative ICPs can be implemented
as reported in Algorithm (1). Starting from an initial partition i = N =
ff1g; f2g; : : : ; fNgg, the edge node iteratively applies the switch operations un-
til it converges to a nal partition f where no further switch operations are
applied.
Data: Set of ICPs N
Result: Coalition structure f
Partition the network in i = N = ff1g; f2g; : : : ; fNgg;
Initialize history function H(i) = ;; 8i 2 N ;
Set the current partition as c = fC1; : : : ; Clg = i;
repeat
for all i 2 N do
for all Ck 2 c
S ; do
if (Ck
Sfig i Cc(i)) then
0 = (cnfCc(i); Ckg)
SfCc(i)nfig; CkSfigg)
c = 0
H(i) = H(i)
S Cc(i)
end
end
end
until Converge to nal Nash-stable partition f = c;
Algorithm 1: Coalition formation for cooperative ICPs
4.2. Stability properties for the ICP coalition formation game
The stability property of coalition structures can be studied through the
Nash-stability concept, see [44], [45] and [42].
Denition 1 (Nash-stable partition). A partition  = fC1; : : : ; Clg is Nash 
stable if 8i 2 N , C(i) i Ck
Sfig for all Ck 2 nC(i)S ;.
In words, a partition  is said Nash-stable if no player i has an incentive
to move from its current coalition to join a dierent coalition of  or to act in
a non-cooperative way. Given the nite number of possible switch operations
that can be applied, starting from the initial coalition structure i, it can be
proven that the proposed algorithm (1) always converges to a nal partition
f of disjoint coalitions [46] [30]. In fact, based on the switch rule after each
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switch operation, the resulting coalition is preferred to the previous coalitions.
Consequently, a tested feasible coalition structure cannot be created again by
any further switch operation. Since the total number of partitions is nite, the
switch iterations will end by converging to a nal partition.
Proposition 1. Any nal partition f for the coalition formation algorithm in
Algorithm 1 is a Nash-stable partition [42].
Proof. This proposition can be proved by contradiction, assuming that the
nal partition f is not Nash-stable. This means that there exist a player
i 2 N and a coalition Ck 2 f
S ; such that CkSfig i Cf (i). If this is the
case, player i will perform a switch operation which contradicts the assumption
that f is the nal partition of the algorithm.
Nash-stability captures stability notions by only focusing on the movement
of single players. Other stability concepts, such as the core-stability, model
the stability considering the movements of groups of players; anyway, these are
computationally hard to obtain. Therefore, Nash-stability is usually considered
as a good trade-o and our algorithm always converges to a partition f that
is Nash-stable.
5. Performance Evaluation
In this section we evaluate the performance of the proposed MIFaaS paradigm
by considering heterogeneous IoT scenarios where ICPs can request services,
whose elementary tasks include computation, storage, and dierent types of
sensing activities. The adopted tool is an ad-hoc conceived simulation environ-
ment implemented in Matlab. In particular, our simulator analyses the feder-
ation process as a time-slotted solution, by matching ICP service requirements
with the available device resources. By this we mean that after collecting a
set of requests over a predetermined time interval, the edge node evaluates the
cooperation strategies among the ICPs. At this time, our simulator analyses
the federation process, by matching ICP service requirements with the available
resources and iterating the coalition formation process until convergence to a
nal stable coalition structure of federated ICPs. As an alternative, a discrete-
event simulator could be implemented to better model the evolution over time
of the scenarios. The simulation environment can be further enhanced by im-
plementing a detailed physical layer. Nonetheless, the federation operations are
run in the edge node based on the virtual counterparts of the physical objects.
As a consequence, once the physical devices are matched into the virtual space,
they become independent of their physical characteristics.
The performance evaluation aims at: (i) presenting results relevant to the
percentage of served tasks and the resources per ICP used when adopting the
proposed solution compared to alternative solutions, and (ii) giving insights on
the proposed game theoretic solution for the federation formation in terms of
number of federations formed, and percentage of satised ICPs. In our study, a
16
Table 2: Main simulation parameters
Parameter Value
Number of ICPs [4-22]
Number of devices per ICP 3
Computation units per task request [1-5] MFLOPS
Storage units per task request [10-50] MBytes
Number of sensing types 4
Sensing units per task request [1-5]
Computation capacity per device [1-10] MFLOPS
Storage resource units per device [10-100] MBytes
Sensing resource units per device [0-1]
Number of runs per simulation 500
Mobility factor pi [0.2]
Compromise factor i [0-1]
self-interested ICP is considered as satised if it obtains a utility (see denition
in (4)) that is larger or equal to the utility it receives when working alone
without joining a cooperative federation. A wide range of simulative scenarios
are considered where the values of the main parameters of the proposed model
are suitably tuned for IoT environments (parameter settings are given in Table
2). In our analysis, four solutions are compared:
 ICP federation: this is the proposed solution where the game theoretic
federation formation algorithm in Section 4 is implemented;
 No federation: with this solution the single ICPs are working as stand-
alone entities without forming cooperative federations;
 Device federation: this solution represents a typical MCC solution where
the devices in the system cooperate as independent entities. Specically,
this solution implements the same game theoretic federation solution con-
ceived for the ICPs in Section 4, while considering the single devices as
the players for the game instead of the ICPs.
Moreover, we consider a benchmark solution for further comparison, wherein
all available ICPs (not only those interested in some tasks) are part of a unique
federation and resources available in all their devices are exploited to best match
the task requests.
In the rst analysis we consider a sample scenario where the number of ICPs
in the system is set to 4 and each ICP has 3 devices. Each device is endowed
with a minimum of 1 and a maximum of 3 resources, randomly selected among
the six types of resources we considered, i.e., [1-10] MFLOPS for computation,
[10-100] MBytes of storage capacity, and embedded sensors of four possible types
(e.g., humidity, temperature, pressure, movement). The number of task requests
generated are reported in Table 2. In particular, we generated task requests so
that the total amount of resources available and the total amount of resources
requested by the tasks are comparable. This setting guarantees that, in the
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Figure 3: Impact of mobility and compromise factor on the number of successfully executed
tasks.
best case, all task requests can be successfully executed. Finally, we considered
dierent values of the compromise factor .
The rst results in Fig. 3 show the percentage of executed tasks when con-
sidering all ICPs either being static or mobile and for dierent values of the
compromise factor (other values of % of mobile ICPs bring to results falling
in-between the two extreme cases reported in the plots). Results are shown
with a 95% condence interval. As expected, from the plots we note that,
for all solutions, mobility adversely aects the number of successfully executed
tasks. Another expected result is that the No federation and the Benchmark
solution always show the lowest and the highest performance respectively both
for all static ICPs and for all mobile ICPs. An exception exist in case of com-
promise factor set to one and all mobile ICPs, where the Device federation is
the worst performing solution. Interesting to notice, always the proposed ICP
federation solution outperforms the Device federation. Moreover, we observe
that the higher the value of , the greater is the importance the players at-
tribute to the cost term in their payo computation. As a consequence, a lower
percentage of successfully executed tasks is obtained when increasing  for the
federation based solutions. This testies to the fact that the single game players
are more reluctant to cooperate and to sacrice their resources to solve tasks in
the federation.
The next plots we report in Fig. 4 show the percentage of ICPs being
satised. The considered scenario is the same as in Fig. 4 (note that the
No federation is not reported as no comparison can be made to evaluate the
ICP satisfaction). The importance of these plots is to show that although the
Benchmark solution allows to satisfy more tasks, the self-interested players are
not satised by such a service conguration because they obtain less utility than
in the case they work alone. Noteworthy, we wish to recall that our proposed
solution guarantees the stability of the formed coalition structure. This is also
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Figure 4: Impact of mobility and compromise factor on the ICP satisfaction.
supported by the 100% of satised ICPs in all of the tested cases for the ICP
federation solution. In particular, the Benchmark and the Device federation
solutions fall below the 57% value and 65% value, respectively, of satised ICPs,
as the case when all ICPs are mobile and the compromise factor is set to one.
5.1. Analysis for a varying number of ICPs
In this second analysis we investigate on the behavior of the proposed ICP
federation solution when varying the number of ICPs in the network (the range
of ICPs is between 4 and 22). In particular, we consider the results for the case
when all ICPs are mobile (for a lower number of mobile ICPs better results are
obtained). In Fig. 5 we report the percentage of successfully executed tasks, the
amount of resources used per ICP in the federations and the average individual
utility per ICP. As it can be observed, for an increasing number of the ICPs
in the system one observes no performance deterioration. On the contrary, the
proposed solution allows to form cooperative federations of ICPs that increase
the performance. In particular, by jointly observing these plots we can derive
that higher numbers of ICPs in the network has the following eects: (i) the
total amount of executed tasks in the network increases, converging to a value
that is dictated by the combination of resources/task requests in the system;
(ii) the average individual utility per single ICP in the system increases; and
(iii) from 10 ICPs and beyond in the system, the average amount of resources
used per ICP decreases. Moreover, we can observe that in all cases for lower
values of the compromise factor, all of the performance indicators show better
results.
The motivation for this good behavior of the solution may be better un-
derstood by discussing the nal coalition structure of ICPs in the network. To
this aim in Fig. 6 we report information about the number of federations (Fig.
6(a)), the average federation size (Fig. 6(b)) and the size of largest federation
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Figure 5: Impact of number of ICPs and compromise factor (all mobile ICPs).
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Figure 7: Impact of number of devices per ICPs (22 mobile ICPs).
(Fig. 6(c)) the proposed solution converges to. As the plots show, for a higher
number of ICPs in the system the number of federations, the average size of
the federations, and the size of the largest federation in the nal partition in-
crease. This is the main reason for the improved performance shown in Fig. 5,
as in larger coalitions the positive eects of the cooperative behavior have higher
impact. Moreover, for lower values of the compromise factor we observe that
the maximum federation size in a nal partition increases and consequently the
number of federations decreases. The reason for this is that the ICPs are less
restrictive in joining a federation with lower values of the compromise factor.
Finally, it is worth underlining that all nal partitions are stable and the ICPs
are satised in being part of their respective federation.
Finally, we have extended the simulative analysis also to a higher number
of devices in the scenario and, by this, validate the scalability of the proposed
solution. More specically, up to 10 devices per ICP have been considered for a
maximum of 22 mobile ICPs, leading to IoT scenarios with up to 220 devices.
This number of devices is, in our opinion, a realistic value for the small-scale
IoT environments studied in this paper where the edge node is represented, for
instance, by cloud-enhanced access points, such as a Wi-Fi AP or a femtocell.
The results we have obtained with this analysis are shown in 7 and testify that
our proposed solution is scalable, whereas the percentage of successful satised
tasks increases with the number of devices per ICP. This latter is an expected
result, since the more resources are available in a given scenario, the larger are
the opportunities to nd a required device able to serve a task request in a
federation.
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6. Future Works and Open Challenges
In the future we plan to address an extension of the model to include sce-
narios where an ICP represents all the devices owned by a single user, not only
those ones carried along with her. Under these conditions, devices of the same
ICP can be under coverage of multiple edge nodes (example: PC and laptop
at home and car, cell phone, body area sensor network carried around by the
owner). In such a situation, it is important to take into account the latency
introduced by the communication of dierent edge nodes and the introduction
of migration strategies to move the virtual counterpart of the ICP, namely the
ICP controller, from one edge node to another.
We will also make further eorts to thoroughly investigate the energy con-
sumption aspect associated to the proposed MIFaaS paradigm. By accurately
modelling it for the execution of each task and for the transmission and net-
working aspects, suitable task ooading strategies can be studied to improve
energy eciency and prolong the lifetime of battery-equipped devices. In this
way, the federation process will have the possibility to perform the mapping
between tasks and available devices by appropriately considering the battery
energy level of each device and the energy consumption for each task and asso-
ciated networking and communication activities. To this aim, not only should
realistic power consumption models be introduced, but also the task execution
and communication times to obtain valid results that bring to real benets.
Furthermore, major modications should be introduced to the game theoretic
model and, in particular, in the utility function for the players. With respect
to this, the weighted function should be revised to account also for energy con-
sumption and to allow the players dening their preferences in joining/leaving
a coalition by giving priority to either the number of resolved tasks or to energy
saving.
Several further researches may enhance the proposed MIFaaS paradigm in
future IoT scenarios as discussed in the remainder of this Section.
IoT task allocation algorithm : The IoT application requirements may
vary signicantly in Quality of Service (e.g., delay, bandwidth, reliability).
Therefore, ecient task allocation and resource management oered by the ICPs
are of high concern to provide the desired user-perceived quality, i.e., Quality
of Experience (QoE). In particular, task mapping algorithms should eciently
face changing network and workload conditions and may also require dynamic
support from the external clouds.
Mobility pattern prediction : In an extended multiple-edge scenario, de-
vices being part of an ICP could be under the coverage of dierent edge nodes
and follow dierent mobility patterns. Mobility pattern predictions for the single
devices in realistic scenarios are required to build robust and reliable federations
of ICPs. Mobility models should also take into account the type of services of-
fered by single devices, since tasks such as sensing are strictly location-dependent
and change of device's position could reduce the relevance of the generated data.
Several researchers are working on the issue of user mobility pattern prediction
in mobile and wireless environments [47],[48] by adopting also probabilistic and
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geometrical analysis based on stochastic geometry [49]. Their found solutions
may be an inspiration for further investigation on this aspect. Other solutions
based on the Radio signal strength (RSS) for coverage probability may also be
of interest in the decision making for an ecient task allocation. In particular,
when considering networking aspects and the issues related to the network ac-
cess, the RSS may inuence the performances in terms of latency and energy
consumption.
Secure and trusted applications: IoT applications can involve the ex-
change of personal user information, therefore security and trust are of utmost
importance. A weak approach in addressing these issues would also have a
strong negative impact on end users' opinion about the proposed framework.
To this scope, the network infrastructure assistance may play a fundamental role
in our proposed paradigm. Although no specic security algorithms have been
integrated in the solution yet, the need for security has been taken into consider-
ation in the design of the involved entities and their interactions. In particular,
the edge node acting as an orchestrator of the ICP federation may ensure trusted
and secure interactions among ICPs. Moreover, each ICP controller manages
the set of own devices within the ICP, so that appropriate security procedures
can be implemented to guarantee reliable communication within the single ICP.
Further design of solutions for secure and encrypted communications, as well as
trusted interactions between ICPs, will be investigated in our future work. In
this regard, to enhance trustworthiness in the task allocation process, the recent
model of the Social Internet of Things (SIoT) [50] with its notion of object so-
ciality has the potential of building the required trustworthiness among devices
[51].
IoT Cloud interoperability : each Telco provider may adopt dierent im-
plementations of the ICP controller, e.g. by making use of dierent APIs or
semantic languages. As a consequence, ICP controllers registered to dierent
edge nodes may not be able to communicate and cooperate. Indeed, as ex-
plained in [52], data interoperability is still one of the main concerns regarding
IoT solutions, because dierent architectures make frequently use of distinct
semantic languages for data management and dissimilar protocols for data ex-
change. Therefore, to enhance the discovery and the orchestration of the re-
sources a common ontology is required among the ICPs to guarantee seamless
processing and interpretation of data. Very recently [53], FIESTA-IoT achieved
interoperability between FIWARE and OneM2M solutions thank to a semantic
mediator, which represents a major result in this context.
7. Conclusion
In this paper we have presented Mobile-IoT-Federation-as-a-Service (MI-
FaaS), a novel paradigm implemented at the network's edge nodes to support
dynamic cooperation among private/public local clouds of IoT devices. To col-
lectively solve a set of task requests, IoT Cloud Providers (ICPs) cooperate by
forming federations so that the resources of all involved ICPs can be shared,
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while considering rationality and self-interest of the ICPs. To manage the fed-
eration formation process, a game theoretic model has been proposed, which
converges to a Nash-stable solution. A proof-of-concept simulation campaign
has been performed to demonstrate that the proposed paradigm can guarantee
an increased percentage of served tasks when compared to device-oriented and
non-cooperative solutions. Finally, a discussion on open challenges is presented
for the extension of the proposed MIFaaS model in wide area scenarios where
both local and remote devices of an ICP could be involved in the federation
process by relaying on a multi-edge infrastructure. Our future work will also
consider the implementation of a testbed in realistic IoT environments to fur-
ther validate the proposed paradigm and support it with experimental results.
This experimental approach with a running prototype implementation would
allow us to verify the proposed modeling and obtain indications about practical
benets of the developed strategy.
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